Myrdal set to writing The Challenge of World Poverty at a critical time both in the history of the relationship between the rich Western democracies and the poor countries and in his own life's work. In the late 1960s, he and Alva were busy reinvesting their intellectual energies back in Stockholm after more than a decade either in Delhi or on the road (while Gunnar wrote Asian Drama and Alva pursued her diplomatic career). 9 But revisiting one of his longest-standing concerns-the aspiration to extend the national welfare state internationally-with the experience of Asian Drama behind him, with social democratic Sweden around him (from 1967 to 1973 he was the founding chair of the governing board of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI), and amid the wider international climate of the Vietnam escalation (he was active in at least two antiwar groups in Sweden), Myrdal was prompted to reassess much of what had passed as common sense for him before. 10 He seemed for the first time to recognize that the changing nature of domestic citizenship at home in the rich countries was likely to be decisive in how the benefits of the welfare state were to be extended internationally.
In the postwar era, the former "antinomy between economic internationalism and economic nationalism was resolved decisively in favor of the latter," Jamie Martin rightly points out in his essay for this dossier. But on the cusp of the 1970s, as Myrdal was at work on The Challenge of World Poverty, the advanced industrial nations were just then coming to the conclusion that this antinomy might now be resolved in a radically different way. For one there was the rich nations' turn to international institutions as a specific strategy for meeting the growing welfare demands of their citizens (one aspect of which Alan Milward would later characterize as the "European rescue of the nation state"). 11 For another, the rise of international finance meant they no longer needed to refrain from the benefits of more fully opening up their national economies to international currency movements (since the risks of this new liberalized economy could be borne disproportionately by others-which meant, in practice, the poor countries). 12 In the language of the time, "interdependence" now became the key foreign policy challenge of the age. 13 In short, it was not just the relationship between the rich and the poor countries that had changed as Myrdal was writing but the relationship between the national and the international scale itself that was undergoing another of its periodic tectonic shifts. Aware of the former, but hazier on the latter, Myrdal set out to fit these changes into his understanding of the history of nationally metered global inequality: interpreting it as he had always done as a function of "circular and cumulative causation" but adding now one or two accommodationist shifts. 14 Myrdal thus began The Challenge of World Poverty with an analysis of the problem confronting the poor countries. He then turned to the responsibilities of the rich countries, before offering a synthesis of the two. This was a structure he had used many times before in analyzing the problem of "an international economy." He saw no reason to change it now when it came to drawing the lessons. He did, however, see fit to draw a different moral.
Myrdal first took up the problem as it confronted the poor countries, reprising the basic thrust of his argument in Asian Drama but also fixing it more specifically now to the question of domestic inequality: "the equality issue is central in the development problems of underdeveloped countries . . . [it] becomes an element, often a main element, in all specific policy issues such as community development, agricultural policy, education reform, and of course taxation" (49). These topics composed the bulk of his empirical exegesis, and in each his intention was to demonstrate that to the numerators of underdevelopment a, b, c, d, and e, should be added the common denominator of inequality. But Myrdal is thinking here primarily of domestic inequality. Aside from a few passing references to "neo-colonialism," and even a tongue-in-cheek segue to take in Justice William Douglas's (already then somewhat dated) call for America to stand with the forces of "world revolution" not "political reaction," he had little of substance to say about the ways in which rich country "power geometries," as we might call them today, transected with those in poor countries (75).
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This somewhat contradicted his argument in part 3, where he turned to the "responsibility of the developed countries" (270). As Myrdal saw it, these responsibilities chiefly involved overcoming their intellectual myopia, beginning with the theory of international trade. Here the nature of interstate relations enters the scene for the first time. Economists had been wrong to stress a natural tendency toward the international equalization of incomes. On the contrary, Myrdal had long pointed out, trade and capital movements alike "will generally tend to breed inequality [between nations], and will do so the more strongly when substantial [domestic] inequalities are already established" (279). In short, people should feel as guilty about the trade they happily undertook with the poor countries (given the terms of that trade) as they did about the aid they did not give. Myrdal places much of the blame here too on the rising burden of debt that these forms of unequal exchange were fastening on the poor countries. Writing in the 1960s, he was not alone in this. "The machinery of economic development could be overloaded with foreign debt until it sputtered to a halt amid half-built projects and mountains of discarded plans," the former president of the World Bank, Eugene Black (1949-62), had put it. Black's successor, George Woods (1962-68), likewise followed up on the warnings of a "debt explosion." But there was little willingness to translate these concerns into more flexible public finance. Rather, "the trend has gone in the opposite way," Myrdal lamented.
In fact, the trend was about to worsen. Myrdal recognized what was to be one of the key aspects of this when he concluded his critique of the rich countries with a nod toward the emerging specter of inflation. It was common at this time for the rich countries to raise the white flag of their own exchange balances as a reason for not entering into fairer terms of trade with the poor world. But these "must be considered self-inflicted" Myrdal shot back-a product, particularly in the United States, of rising public and private consumption, along with huge expenditures on armaments for Vietnam, "moon flights, etc," without corresponding increases in taxation. "The result is inflation," Myrdal pointed out and, worst of all, when that inflation is unevenly distributed between the rich nations it contributed also to exchange difficulties. At the same time, the actual steps needed to even up terms of trade (more aid, lower tariffs, less bilateral agreements) are "small aid" in comparison: by which he meant they were eminently doable (300-301). For Myrdal the more "emphatic" and "extravagant" declarations of the rich countries toward the poor, be it the UN's Charter with its "We the peoples . . . ," Kennedy's "Development Decade," or Johnson's "War on Poverty" were not only superfluous to requirements. They had, if anything, actually worked to obscure what was really at play: the calculating pursuit by the wealthier countries of geostrategic advantage in the Cold War and the displacement abroad of the true costs of the prosperity they enjoyed at home.
When pieced together this was about as radical an analysis it was possible to put forward at the start of the 1970s and still hope to find a sympathetic hearing among the liberal policy elite in America that Myrdal most wished to influence. A diplomat when he wanted to be, Myrdal therefore softened the blow by flattering his targets. "International leadership" was needed more than ever from the United States, he said, but it "must be in the form of vigorous attempts to strengthen international compassion and solidarity, necessary to build up intergovernmental cooperation within the United Nations for disarmament, global peace-keeping, and joint responsibility for the development and welfare of the poor countries" (PAGE). Myrdal needn't have bothered. No amount of sweetening the pill could disguise the fact that 1970 was a terrible year in which to be publishing a book on the nature of the rich countries' obligations to the poor world.
It was, first of all, a pivotal moment for the West. Within a year the Bretton Woods system had begun its rapid decline, with Nixon's suspension of the dollar's convertibility into gold as part of his New Economic Policy of June 1971. In 1973 the first OPEC oil shock exacerbated the resulting international monetary instability and added to mounting fears of resource scarcity. Further adding to this "complex of problems" were the more secular changes underway in the European and American domestic economies, as they now variously began their transition from a Fordist to post-Fordist regime of accumulation (xii). This would profoundly transform not only their domestic welfare states but also the underlying terms of their economic relations with the poor countries. In short, the very ground on which Myrdal believed he stood while writing this book was falling out from under him. Not least, from out of the inflationary crises of the 1970s, a new anti-inflationary, distinctly conservative fiscal consensus-the birthing water of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan-was soon being generated. 16 And as Western nations looked for new, non-Keynesian ways to deal with the problem of stagflation, the gun was also being loaded for the Volcker interest rate hike of 1981 and the subsequent "lost decade" across much of the developing world (as interest rate rises in America led first to higher international loan repayments and in due course to defaults and unsustainable debt burdens: first in Mexico, then Brazil, Venezuela, Chile, Peru, and Ecuador).
The year 1970 was thus also poignantly located within the history of the developing nations. Perhaps most significantly, The Challenge of World Poverty was situated midway on the arc of a rising tide of anger that linked the frustrations of the first UNCTAD conference of 1964 in Geneva with the declaration of the NIEO in 1974. As Myrdal was writing, the Latin American "powder keg," as he described it, had been lighting up for some time. The fiasco of Guevara's last stand in Bolivia had ended in 1967, but not before his public message to the first tricontinental meeting in Havana of Asian, African, and Latin American radicals to "create two, three, many Vietnams." UNCTAD and the NIEO were in certain respects the diplomatic face of this same wave of anticolonial nationalism. Headed by the Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch, UNCTAD attempted to forge a more effective north-south dialogue and to achieve a fairer climate for international trade. Conceived as a permanent negotiating instrument, one around which the G-77 nations would for the first time coalesce as a distinctive (if not always unified) voice, it was one of the most important events in the United Nations' history, according to Secretary General U. Thant. 17 UNCTAD was also intended from the start to put the specific problems of developing countries firmly on the rich world's agenda.
Encouraged by Kennedy's announcement of a Decade of Development in 1961, the developing nations put enormous faith in UNCTAD. Yet already by the time of its second round, held in Delhi in 1968, those hopes had been dashed. Myrdal himself described the Delhi round as "almost a complete failure" and he shared Prebisch's verdict on the reasons: "It seems that prosperity, in people as well as in nations, tends to form an attitude of detachment if not indifference to the well-being of others," as Prebisch put it (301). But it was always much more than that, of course. As U.S. representative George Ball wrote back to the State Department during the first round in 1964, the rich countries may have been playing along but they had no real intention of giving what the poor countries were asking for. 18 The failure of the NIEO and the establishment of what Mark Mazower has termed the "real new international economic order" was to reveal something else about the relationship between rich countries and poor.
19 Namely, for all that Third Worldist scholars like Andre Gunder Frank, Keith Griffin, and Samir Amin were at this point making waves with their theories of the capitalist "development of underdevelopment," the rich countries too, and the United States in particular, were coming to a sharp realization as to the nature of their own "dependencies" in an age of growing "raw material sovereignty."
20 In an important sense, then, the "age of fracture" as Daniel Rodgers has so vividly characterized it for the rich democracies, was breaking at this moment on the international realm as well. 21 The years after the publication of The Challenge of World Poverty were also when a new age of humanitarianism and human rights came to dominate the international agenda. This too was to profoundly change the very backdrop against which Myrdal was speaking. For just as the Western left was discovering at this moment that, whatever it did or said, its once core constituency of a convenable working class was dissipating before its eyes-at least partly because of the achievements of the welfare state-and a moment of national political possibility was closing down, so too was Myrdal speaking to a moment of international possibility that was on the way out.
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"Optimism . . . about the third world gave way to dark pessimism."
23 Daniel Patrick Moynihan's response to the NIEO-it was nothing less than a case of "third world extremism," he said, as if geography itself were a new form of terror-stands in somewhat for the general decline in Western willingness to jaw-jaw thereafter. 24 Henceforth talk of interstate transfers, of transnational organizations and "enlightened" national governments as seedbeds of an elective global public fell away, as indeed did the popularity of structural analyses of the condition of world poverty. Instead it was the dilemmas of "global hunger" and the challenge of "lifeboat earth" that would illuminate the remaining available paths toward the contemporary era of global "governance." Henceforth, poverty came increasingly to be seen, though not for the first time of course, as a property of the poor themselves. International bodies like the World Bank that had been established to channel the surplus capital and resources of the rich world toward the "take off," "integration," and "catching-up" of the poor countries were assigned new roles as the surveillant and disciplinary organs of a Western-oriented global market economy. It was thus not just the values and the objectives that were receding from Myrdal's grasp as The Challenge of World Poverty hit the printing press. It was the very tools with which Myrdal would have his policy prescriptions carried out. Not unaware, this seems to have set Myrdal to rethinking-a rethinking that goes at least some of the way toward explaining the central conundrum of the book: namely, why a book that is fundamentally concerned with inequality should be subtitled (and rhetorically framed as) an "anti-poverty manifesto."
The Equality Issue in World Development
To resolve this conundrum we need to delve a little deeper into the role of equality in Myrdal's thinking. Equality had long been one of Myrdal's central preoccupations. "We deceive ourselves," he wrote in 1960, "if we believe that we can create a vision that can successfully compete with political communism merely by offering liberty in some form, while shying away from the other main component ideal in the Western heritage-equality." 25 Moreover, he consistently argued, for much of the time against the mainstream of his profession, that equality was no externality of benign economic growth. Nor was inequality somehow necessary for economic growth-a view that had become standard since Simon Kuznets's Economic Growth and Income Inequality (1955) . 26 Rather, equality was the necessary condition for economic growth because, to compress the argument rather brutally, it nourished the quality of the social institutions that growth relied on.
Unusually for a First World economist, Myrdal further carried this institutional (and distinctly social democratic) understanding of equality with him over to his first serious engagements with the question of economic development and underdevelopment in the mid-1950s. And in making this case Myrdal thus placed himself at the very cusp of a generation of thought about the international politics of social duties: for what he was raising, in effect, was a global social question along the lines that the national social question-la question sociale, die soziale frage-had begun to be asked within the rich countries a century before. 27 The 1956 lectures he gave in Egypt at the invitation of the National Bank of Cairo, for example, were primarily concerned with the inadequacy of existing economic theory to explain the ongoing underdevelopment of the poor world. 28 As Myrdal argued, there was no stable economic equilibrium within and between nations, as classical economics assumed, and so the only solution to the "circular and cumulative" nature of economic development in some parts of the world and economic underdevelopment in others was coordinated planning. Planning was necessary to even out the "backwash" effects of international trade and to counter for political inequalities in access to capital and resource within nations. In short, the "trail he blazed," as Samuel Moyn puts it elsewhere in this collection of essays, was to show that inequality was the primary problem that needed solving: economic (and indeed social) development would follow. 29 It was this understanding of the problem of underdevelopment as being fundamentally a problem of insufficient equality that placed the idea of a "welfare world" at the very heart of Myrdal's analysis of economic underdevelopment, a point he would go on to elaborate in Beyond the Welfare State. By this he did not mean, as has often been assumed, a form of "global" welfare: "to realize in the wider world community the goals of the national Welfare State," as one write-up of this argument had it after a lecture Myrdal gave at Columbia in 1960. 30 Myrdal was all too aware that the bonds of international solidarity required to constitute a "global community" were simply too weak. What he envisaged, rather, was the establishment of the international conditions for the global spread of the national welfare state. And by this he meant "the internationalization of national policy structures" as part of a wider and necessarily gradualist process of "transforming . . . national integration into a more inclusive international solidarity." 31 In Myrdal's imagining, welfare world would thus be a state of "created harmony" (my emphasis) in which "people in the developed countries must be made to feel something of the rational generosity in their relations with underdeveloped countries that has gradually developed in the internal relations" (298-99, emphasis in original).
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If this was a more modest proposal, it was still a radical departure from the actually existing "international economy" and the direction in which many of his colleagues were traveling. It was also one that he elaborated in close dialogue-as ever-with Alva Myrdal, who spoke to the theme of a "scientific approach to international welfare" in her own capacity as the then director of the Department of Social Science at UNESCO, in a lecture of at Columbia University in 1953. 33 Promoting welfare was a "generational challenge," and Alva drew attention to the temptation of directing aid to economic growth in place of social welfare to underscore why the challenge would only become more pressing over time. 34 Like Gunnar she too raised the question of scale clearly, insofar as this was an obstacle to welfare reform in the poor countries, yet she too failed to see the international domain as any more than a constellation of tessellating nationalisms: not as the global sphere of combined and uneven developments it surely was, and thereby itself also a necessary locus of political activity in any aspirant welfare world. "Unbalanced development" was thus a resolutely national concern and the remedy lay in the possible multiplier effects of externally energized "community development." 35 This at any rate would stand in, duly shepherded by the midwifery of social welfare workers, until indigenous communities became sufficiently "individualized in their own psychology."
No less than Alva, who decried the lack of an appropriate "theory of social change," Gunnar was not fooled either as to the difficulties of realizing any of this.
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Above all, as he was quick to underscore, the achievement of the welfare state at home was itself one of the primary impediments to achieving it abroad. 37 This was a theme outlined in Cairo and repeated in both the Dyason Lectures he gave in Melbourne (in 1957) and the Storr Lectures he gave at Yale (in 1958). The welfare state built up social solidarity and security and its continuation in democratic states was guaranteed, he believed. But the national welfare state itself contributed to a form of human solidarity that "stopped clear at the national boundary."
38 Despite this scalar paradox, Myrdal believed in his earliest forays into development economics that this was a surmountable challenge. So much so, in fact, that in his earlier writing he was not even convinced of the need for any separate or additional redistribution of wealth between nations: "A wholescale income equalization by redistribution between nations is both impossible and, I am inclined to believe, an unimportant objective." 39 The point, rather, was to address the structural impediments to greater equality by fostering both greater international cooperation and the cosmopolitan solidarity this relied on.
To the extent that something like aid (qua economic redistribution) was less important in Myrdal's earlier thinking, then, this was because it represented for him merely a poor substitute for "a wider rational equalization program"-one that included political and institutional reforms as well. Perhaps inflected by having arrived in Cairo "at the height of Egyptian nationalism," itself a focal point in the rising tide of the non-aligned movement, Myrdal also initially put great faith in "the appearance on the stage of the learned discourse of a host of new participants from nations which have until recently been kept passively submissive and mute." 40 He was thinking here not just of the non-aligned movement as a political force but of the intellectual waters flowing into public debate from the new regional commissions such as the Economic Commission for Latin American (better known by its Spanish acronym of CEPAL) formerly headed by Prébisch, and from the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) that Myrdal himself had overseen during its formative years. Indeed, at this stage he seems to have thought that the challenge of overcoming the nationalistic tendencies of the Western welfare state would, under pressure from these global institutional bully pulpits, not only prove a surmountable challenge; it was practically inevitable.
That was before, however. The "challenge of world poverty" as Myrdal came to see it by the end of the 1960s was a different one. By then it had become clear, even to he who counted himself among the "dreamers" of the new day, that Western countries in fact had found every reason to avoid surmounting the problems created by the inherent nationalism of their own welfare states. And rather than get drawn into making a more radical counterargument, it seems Myrdal instead now modulated his earlier arguments for welfare world to fit the new contingencies. The failure of UNCTAD provides clues, and some justification, as to why he took this path. Myrdal did not disagree with the call for more structural reforms put forward by UNCTAD and the NIEO, but he clearly did not hold out much hope for them actually being put into place either. He thus now switched tack and laid greater weight on aid as the most important thing the rich countries needed to do: in part because he felt that anything else would be politically toxic and because the prospects for a wider "managed consensus" on the international economy-prospects which had once seemed so bright-had by now receded almost entirely from view. And on this, of course, he was absolutely right.
The Challenge of World Poverty's revisitation of welfare world needs approaching in light of this. Myrdal had not, by 1970, given up on the desirability of a welfare world. But he did seem to have realized, given the current international climate, that aid was the most he could ask for (for all that he still recognized that the mere transfer of wealth from rich to poor on its own was insufficient). And aid being the chosen tool, the question Myrdal seems to have ultimately come round to asking himself in this book was what was the most that could possibly be done with it? The book that The Challenge of World Poverty ultimately became (rather than the one Myrdal initially set out to write) thus concerned itself with two interrelated questions: first, how to create a realistic pathway toward international redistribution using aid as the primary tool; and second, how to convince the public and their politicians that this was both necessary and affordable. Myrdal again made the welfare state central to both his answers, but not-and this is crucial-in the way he had earlier suggested. Before, the Western welfare state had been the model for, and yet also the barrier to, welfare world on account of its intrinsic nationalism; now Myrdal sought to demonstrate it could be the bridge. If the Western welfare state could not be spread or institutionalized internationally, if it could not be scaled up in the current climate, perhaps it could at least be deployed at home to enable a relatively greater degree of "rational equalization"-via aid-globally.
Here was the classic Myrdalian move. In place of an (American) "dilemma" or (Asian) "drama" we now have a (global) "challenge": this time, the challenge of turning the Western welfare state from a problem to a solution (a reframing of the problem, we might note, that worked to hide a more personal dilemma for Myrdal: his refusal to relinquish either welfare world or the American creed). As Myrdal now presented it, only through the institutional organs of the welfare state could the kind of sacrifices necessary to enable a greater flow of aid to the poor world be rendered both manageable and fair in the rich world. One needed the institutions of the welfare state-strong unions with high membership rates, effective systems of social bargaining, a state committed to "rational planning," and so on-in order both to inculcate the need for, and above all to spread the costs of, helping distant strangers. Myrdal pitched this as about finding the means within a democracy to generate consensus for policies with long-term benefits but most likely also short-term costs (299). But this last throw of the global welfare die was also ultimately, in effect, to make this less geopoliticized version of welfare world now entirely reliant on the (presumed fixed) capacity of the Western welfare state to deliver it.
Underpinning this move intellectually was Myrdal's reframing of the question of distribution. Where previously Myrdal had sought to show that the welfare state enabled development (through the socioeconomic benefits it conveyed), he now put greater emphasis on the fact that the welfare state also enabled distribution (of socioeconomic costs). Such a view developed out of not only his reading of the contemporary welfare state in Sweden but also his largely unhappy experiences of trying to actually "plan" for social reforms in the Indian subcontinent. What was now required, simply put, was national distribution of the costs of international integration. In this light, aid could be seen as a natural extension of the Western welfare state, and maximizing this (rather than advocating for new institutions of global welfare per se) was to be the principal objective.
With this argument in place, Myrdal then proceeded to outline a proposal for a form of global tax and spend. As he put it: "In the future we should try to move toward a common recognition of aid to underdeveloped countries as a collective responsibility for the developed countries, the burden of which should be shared in an agreed fair way amounting to an approach to a system of international taxation" (365). Myrdal saw that countries like Sweden, Canada, and the Netherlands were already well on the way toward this. In the United States, he expected that aid appropriations would initially "continue plunging downward for a time." Yet Myrdal remained optimistic that common recognition of the burden of responsibility would win out even in the United States too. The alternative-a system of "tied aid" which "work[s] toward a segregative economic system," private capital inflow statistically gerrymandered into aid contributions, and punitive loan arrangements-was simply too "irrational" for Myrdal to imagine that it could continue for very long (366-67). "An international agreement, binding all developed countries," was what was needed (367). This, then, was how Myrdal sought to square the circle of working toward a more progressive international economy at a time of resurgent national autarky: a reform that was, as he insisted all reforms should be, "radically directed but conservatively managed." 41 If this was now something less than a nation-state-based utopia for the world (it was closer to a nation-state based-response to global dystopia) it was also, it seems, a strategic choice. Myrdal had been against aid before and he would be skeptical of it (for different reasons) again. 42 Turning to the Western welfare state now not as a scalable model for international redistribution but as the means of absorbing the costs (to the rich world) of a greater measure of international economic solidarity probably looked like a good strategic choice at the time. It enabled Myrdal to square against an international climate of growing distrust and anxiety over "inter-dependence" and even allowed him to reframe tax and spend as a cost-effective extension of aid.
And yet, in a further twist, it would turn out to be a highly unfortunate choice as well, albeit for a reason Myrdal can hardly have foreseen. For Myrdal was suddenly now confronted by the fact that, from the early 1970s onward, the gap between the rich and poor within America and other rich Western nations would begin to widen dramatically, after a long period of declining inequality domestically. And this would soon put historic pressure on the rich nations' own domestic welfare states. The tragic irony of The Challenge of World Poverty, then, was that in calling up the Western welfare state to duty as the solution to the problem of generating "take off" in the direction of greater international inequality, Myrdal's book was fated to have been written at the cusp of the historic upswing of Western inequality in the mid-late twentieth century.
Global Welfare in an Age of Inequality
Myrdal's strategic turn to the Western welfare state thus solved one problem but at the cost of creating a new one, and in so doing it opened up a further paradox at the heart of The Challenge of World Poverty. For despite its originally stated intentions, it is neither Africa nor Latin America that ultimately provided the book's new geographical references (Africa gets barely a look in; Latin America is confined to an appendix). 43 Rather the "second case country," as Myrdal announces midway through the book, turned out to be Sweden. Looking to Sweden allowed Myrdal well to show how the Western welfare state might be put to work internationally. But the manner in which he drew the comparison-essentially denuding Sweden of the political dynamics that explained and made possible its greater commitment to foreign aid-was to cause him more problems than it solved. It also suggests that while Myrdal's commitment to the value of equality had not deserted him, even at the end of his long career, his willingness to turn to social democracy as a political paradigm for realizing equality internationally had become increasingly mute, if it had not deserted him outright.
This can itself, I think, be seen as a consequence of the very forces Myrdal was trying to square off against, and it becomes apparent not because Myrdal in any way tries to reject social democracy but in the rather curious way he tries to advocate it. Contra the Americans, Myrdal wrote, in setting out the lesson that Sweden presented for international development, the Swedes "are not inclined to find an excuse for aid in the opportunity to use it for spreading haphazardly a subsidy to private individuals and business firms at home" (360). They were not, in other words, interested in "tied aid," or aid in the service of foreign policy and big business. But this was not because they were social democratic per se, Myrdal asserts. It was a function of historical luck: they had never had colonies or overseas interests to tempt them in this regard. What social democracy contributed, rather, was simply the fact of an extensive welfare state that in turn allowed the "conquering strength" of what Myrdal frames as the "moral" imperative to help distant strangers to rise up and look beyond its own shores (362). As Myrdal said:
I have hesitated to tell this story, feeling that it would sound nationalistic. But I have overcome that hesitation, as I want to be scrupulously honest and I need to cite this actual experience in a laboratory case for the policy conclusions I want to draw . . . There is nothing unusual about the Swedes except that they are placed in a situation where the only reason they could have for aid to underdeveloped countries is the moral one of solidarity with people in distress-the same principle upon which they have built their welfare state at home. (363) Nothing unusual, perhaps, except in comparison to the United States. Myrdal here seems to assume that the difference between a liberal and a social-democratic society is one of moral pedagogy: the Swedes had undertaken such learning and assented to their social duties accordingly; Americans had yet to experience the epiphany. But selling welfarism to his American audience in this way (as a moral rather than political construct) not only required Myrdal to gloss over the history of political struggle that enabled the Swedish welfare state in the first place. He was also forced to downplay the important element of self-interest (not humanitarianism) within that. Moreover, the welfare state-as one of its key critics famously put it-is above all else a power mobilization strategy: a fact that raises the question not just of welfare and development but also of how the social democratic project has brought them together precisely by empowering the weak against the strong.
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By sidestepping this political history, Myrdal was obliged to relocate the core challenge to welfare world in the present. Myrdal had successfully removed the Western welfare state from its role as the primary barrier to welfare world, but in accordance with this more liberal political philosophy he now put the domestic poor of the rich world, and above all of the American poor, in its place. What would stop the Western welfare state from being used to sustain a more generous form of international redistribution? As Myrdal now wrote: "It is wrong to put the blame on the 'capitalists,' as is often done by some ignorant radicals. On this point, the people are the reactionaries" (297, emphasis in original). Moreover, he added, "It is often the poor who are reactionary."
This remarkable passage, which finds its roots in the contemporaneous rise of "community development" and the War on Poverty within the U.S. domestic scene (and which was itself a part of the wider backwash of international development to the national scale), is what pivots Myrdal's earlier calls for welfare world into the new call for an "anti-poverty programme." The solution to international inequality indeed now simply became the education of these vested interests at home (rather than addressing the structural bases of unearned privilege). 45 By glossing the politics of social democracy in such a way that it might sound plausible to expect the same results from a more "enlightened" liberal domestic context like that of the United States, and by founding this in turn on the moral imperative of helping others, the structural inequalities Myrdal initially set out to diagnose now became the walls that defined the limits of his analytical reach, rather than the subject of analysis itself. 46 The way was open, and from the welfarist side no less, for global poverty to replace international inequality as the primary referent of "development." The argument had indeed been staged (and lost) at home.
If Myrdal appeared to have painted himself into a corner here it ought nonetheless to be stressed that he was groping for solutions somewhat in the intellectual dark. The Challenge of World Poverty was written at a moment when the two dominant theoretical preoccupations of the book-domestic redistribution (what Myrdal described in terms the formation of a "hard" state) and the international political system (what he referred to as international "integration")-had yet to be given their classic statements. Rawls's A Theory of Justice, which circled the wagons around the national welfare state by providing a "complex egalitarian" account of "democratic equality," was not published until 1971. Wallerstein's The Modern World System, which nudged theories of world regions toward the notion of a singular (albeit differentiated) space of flows, was not published until 1974. Let alone had the question of how these two lines of inquiry might be addressed simultaneously been raised as directly as Myrdal was raising it here: indeed this was a question that would keep Rawls's interlocutors occupied for several decades. 47 It is hardly surprising that Myrdal therefore lacked the necessary analytical vocabulary with which to fuse national and international ethics together within the liberal tradition he was seeking to reach out to and to influence. And this goes some of the way to explaining why he ended up talking at cross-purposes to himself: falling back on the tautological idea of majoritarian morality, or "right thinking," as the normative bedrock justifying the political claims of a good society. One is left merely to surmise, therefore, that if Perry Anderson could fairly write of Rawl's Theory of Justice-the defining statement on liberal equality-that what it should have been called, or what was at least needed at the time, was a theory of injustice, the same criticism applied only that much more so when it came to Myrdal. 48 For in seeking to give equality faster passage out of troubled waters, Myrdal had been forced to give his original analysis of inequality a second-class ticket. He had become a more liberal egalitarian.
The consequence of this was fateful, for Myrdal was, in effect, taking up position on the same intellectual ground that advocates of global poverty amelioration still occupy today. The dramatic changes in U.S. domestic politics during the age of civil rights and Vietnam had given Americans cause to reevaluate their assumptions about citizenship, morality, religion, and human-nature relationships domestically, and they were forging those into a platform for a new internationalism: one that reached out to help others, rather than seeking to extend its own benefits to them. Myrdal had hitched his continued desire for a welfare world to a political movement he saw correctly had powerful momentum, but whose ultimate direction he miscalculated.
Shortly after Robert McNamara took up office at the World Bank in 1968, for example, the bank shifted emphasis first toward dealing with domestic inequality in the poor countries (not international inequality), then soon after to "absolute poverty" (again at the domestic level of the poor countries), until finally, by the mid-1970s, it was almost purely concerned with "basic needs" within those countries. 49 Distribution became a superfluous metric; politics dropped off the agenda. 50 Henceforth, and for at least the next few decades, the dominant trend in economic development would be for poverty reduction rather than redistribution, and the problems would be almost entirely located in the poor countries alone. The same trend was apparent within the rich countries too; indeed, programs like the deployment of Peace Corps volunteers in the War on Poverty at home had helped consolidate ideas of a singular, organic world poverty. Poverty now resided in the bodies (and choices) of the poor themselves. Charity and philanthropy replaced welfare.
These practical adjustments further intersected with a series of scalar realignments in economic theory that also now pulled Myrdal's earlier arguments out of play. First, "economic growth" was brought back in as a desiderata of development, only this time it was understood as aggregate growth driven by the rich. The poor of the world were simply invited by the rich countries to come and "share" in this new model of prosperity through offers of assistance to help make them more "productive" (in ways that served the needs of the rich countries' economies as well). The rich countries' own domestic poor, meanwhile, would themselves in due course be lifted out of welfare, placed in workfare, and pressed into taking up whatever employment was available to them (usually such rump employment as could not be outsourced to the poor countries). 51 These reconfigured institutional responses were partly, but only partly, about the new "economic ethics" that now preferred a more anodyne measure of poverty alleviation to the politically charged one of inequality. They were equally seized on, in the early 1970s, as political strategies: and specifically as ways to outflank both the NIEO (and the rest of the Third World rising) and domestic "social problems" at home.
The NIEO, for example, was about national scale redistribution: a better deal for poor countries. Basic needs circumvented its calls by going directly to the people (a fact which no doubt explains the lukewarm response to it by poor country governments).
52
Social problems at home, meanwhile, were individualized the better to avoid federal culpability.
53 They were also projected onto particular "communities," which were themselves further located in the city and thereby further written out of "society." 54 In the process the links between the creation of rich world wealth and poor country poverty were analytically severed for a generation (even as solutions for their management and control were increasingly transferred between them). This came at the very moment, moreover, that domestically empowered corporations, global finance, and the vast reshaping of class relations internationally under an emergent New International Division of Labor were about to ensure that the wealth of the rich and the poverty of the poor everywhere, at home and abroad, were more intimately linked than ever before.
Myrdal was right, therefore, that the battleground had shifted to within the rich countries. This was to prove a generational shift, and his genius in this book was to recognize this and to seek to find a way to respond to it. But his effort to shore up the prospects for welfare world by reframing the function of the Western welfare state within that also required Myrdal to reframe his earlier social democratic internationalism as a form of national humanitarianism that he believed made a stronger case, in a hostile international climate, for the transnational solidarity he wished to see. This ultimately provided the tools for others to reimagine and reconstruct that transnational solidarity as a form of individualist (and rights-based) humanitarianism. In so doing it also directly mirrored the process then underway within American liberalism more specifically: wherein the arguments deployed to defend the national welfare state by thinkers such as Rawls ended up, inadvertently, providing the foundation for a cosmopolitan individualism they did not necessarily approve of.
55

Conclusion
Ultimately Myrdal's The Challenge of World Poverty was proven right in the manner it was declared at the time to be wrong: the deafening silence with which his policy advice was greeted. What the world got after 1970 was global triage, not global welfare. 56 Both futures were imaginable within Myrdal's still viable analytical model of circular and cumulative causation. They fairly represented the two "developmental" choices as were presented to the world in the late 1960s and early 1970s. And it was Myrdal's great achievement to have been able to specify quite accurately the nature of this fork in the road.
Nonetheless, it was also Myrdal's great failure, and to some extent poor luck, that the choices that fork imposed (between freedom and equality, rights and responsibilities, and the relative costs and benefits of retrenching the welfare state vs. expanding it) were already being made in favor of liberty, human rights, and "divestiture" of the welfare state-for together they defined a very different future for international development. 57 Having reframed his earlier arguments within the liberal paradigm, Myrdal now lacked the structural bite needed to explain why these choices might also turn out to be compromises: that the promotion of human freedom was not a sufficient substitute for the parallel search for equality, for example. He was also forced to downplay the fact that the Western welfare state might be a solution to "world poverty" only under very specific political conditions. For this reason alone his work provided insufficient means to foster the greater empathy that he himself called for.
Myrdal failed in this not on account of his technical analyses but on account of his interpretation of the wider problem of global inequality as one of insufficient morality and his coming to hold the Western world's poor (the "basket of deplorables" as they might be referred to today) chiefly responsible for this, rather than the structural inequalities on which he had earlier placed greater emphasis. 58 This shortcircuited his own analytical framework and seems to have prevented him from seeing that inequality was not merely an indicator of failed politics: it could itself be the basis for a highly successful political project, such as neoliberalism in particular now became. To say all of this is in part, of course, to accuse Myrdal unfairly of not preventing the future from arriving. But it is also to recognize that the future he failed to prevent was one built on a series of arguments that he (and many others) failed to win in his lifetime. 
